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My plan is to use the broadest of brushes to describe rigorous but low key
notions of indeterminism and free will as they occur in some recent work based
on the idea of “branching histories.”1 It is of course not so obvious in advance
at just which target we are aiming, although below we report some contributions
by baseball’s Yogi Berra that help clarify our hopes. In the meantime, although it
will hardly be surprising if you find yourself harboring definite reservations and
uncertainties, I hope the meaning of our ideas will become moderately clear.
1 Introduction
Philosophy has always contained separate scientific images and humanistic im-
ages (Sellars called them the scientific and manifest images), and many philo-
sophical enterprises can be described as either lying wholly within one image
while either ignoring or being contemptuous of the other, or as trying in some
sense to reduce one to the other. Our enterprise for the past few years can be seen
as an effort to find ways in which the two images fit together, without diminu-
tion of either. Our particular strategy is to look for very general quasi-geometrical
structures that underlie both images. In this sense our theory could be described
as equally proto-scientific and proto-humanistic. The enterprise isn’t itself either
1Many of the ideas related to agency were first developed by von Kutschera over fifteen years
ago (von Kutschera 1986). Since about the same time Paul Bartha, Mitchell Green, John Horty,
Michael Perloff, Matthew Weiner, Ming Xu and the author have intermittently worried at different
aspects of the topic, often jointly. Recent book-length reports, which include references to papers
by the named workers as well as to important books and papers by others, are Horty 2001 and
Belnap, Perloff and Xu 2001.
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scientific or humanistic, but it does try to provide some ways of thinking that are
intended as useful for both.
I am going to begin by describing some features of our general “branching
histories” framework. Second, I shall try to give you some of the flavor of how
the theory of branching histories applies to the humanistic concepts of action and
agency and choice—and free will. Third, I shall say something about how branch-
ing histories help us to get a little clearer on how indeterminism ought to work in
our scientific views.
2 Branching histories
The “branching histories” framework offers a theory of possibility, or, much bet-
ter, possibilities.
2.1 Importance of objective possibility
Every philosophy must somehow or other take account of the category of possi-
bilities, a foundation on which many of our most fundamental concepts rest. Here
there is a great divide. For some applications one needs only unreal possibilities.
Perhaps they are given in the mind, as imaginary or fancied alternatives to our
actual situation. Or perhaps the possibilities are constructed in some clever way
out of concepts or language or social structures such as conversations. For exam-
ple, in making sense out of fiction or belief or justification or good reasoning, the
alternatives one brings into play need only be plausible.
It is the same in science. For many purposes, scientific possibilities need to
have only epistemic, which is to say, mental status, in someone’s mind, or perhaps
social status in a family practices. For these limited, chiefly heuristic, purposes,
the time-worn phrase, “consistency with the laws,” has some utility as an account
of possibility. This remains true even though, as is obvious, “the laws” are just
slippery pieces of language, made by man. The point is that for heuristic and
practical purposes, there is often no need for anything more.
But for certain concepts, one must insist on—in a phrase of Xu 1997—possibilities
based in reality. To settle for some kind of “compatibilism” that would combine
“scientific” or “objective” determinism with slippery subjective or linguistic no-
tions of possibility is, we think, to lose one’s grip.
Let me list some obvious places in which one needs real (objective) possibili-
ties.
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1. There is no objective probability without objective possibility. It is easy
to neglect this. We teach students to race through the probability calculus
without paying attention to what it means. And even though philosophers
debate endlessly and fruitlessly about the meaning of probability, this much
is plain: If you are unable to give an account of the possible and the im-
possible, you will never be able to give an account of the probable and the
improbable. How could you? In technical terms, it is the real possibilities
that provide the so-called probability space that must be found under any ob-
jective probability measure. If you don’t have possibilities you don’t have
a probability space; and if you don’t have a probability space you certainly
cannot have a probability.
2. There is no action, no doing, no responsibility, no agency, without pos-
sibility. This is a principle theme, and I shall return to it later. There is
neither justified hope nor justified fear, neither obligation nor license, nei-
ther justified pride nor regret, unless there be possibilities rooted not just in
someone’s mind, but in reality as well.
3. Perhaps of most significance, there is no causality without objective possi-
bilities. This is a second principle theme, and again it is one to which I shall
return, although very briefly and without the likelihood, in this brief com-
pass, of much clarity. In the meantime, keep in mind that there are many
causal concepts without the word cause. Here are just a few: influencing,
interfering, intervening, and experimenting. None of these make real sense
unless there are real possibilities.
Since Leibniz, however, much philosophy has either neglected to take real
possibilities seriously, or, having taken up the challenge that they present, has de-
clared them null and void. Because many of us participate in the strict-deterministic
attitudes engendered by this philosophical history, it is worth pausing a moment in
order to ask why. After long preparation by theological meditation on the mean-
ings of Omnipotence and Omniscience, presumably a fresh cause was the mar-
velous practical success of deterministic mathematical physics. Laplace says that
his demon leaves no room for really alternative possibilities. To be consistent
with this world-view, Hume says that causality is not objective at all, but instead
a habit of mind. Kant, sharing his century’s conviction in the absolute accuracy
of the deterministic vision, says that there is no possibility beyond actuality, and
indeed, that there is no actuality that goes beyond ironclad necessity. In Kant’s
effort to make sense out of strict determinism, possibility, actuality, and necessity
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are the same thing. With the spread of lockstep clocks and machines, and with so
much genius philosophizing in behalf of strict determinism, it is hardly surprising
that many philosophers fail to take seriously the idea of objective possibilities.
Without urging this explanation of why philosophy has tended largely (but
certainly not entirely!) to avoid the idea of real possibility, let us pass on to the
central ideas of branching histories relevant to the problem of fitting objective
possibilities together into a single world. There are some generic ideas about
branching histories that come from the idea of possibility itself. And then there
are two special cases. The special cases have been called, some what ponderously,
“branching time” and “branching space-times”; but we shall have little need for
these heavy words.
2.2 How objective possibilities fit together
Let us begin with the more general ideas of branching histories. They are as fol-
lows: (1) Our World and its possibilities, (2) events, (3) histories, (4) consistency,
(5) branching, and (6) causality.
Our world. First and foremost, Our World. Metaphysical modal logicians to
the contrary, possibility based in reality calls for only one world, yours and mine.
Many things belong to Our World, certainly many more, as Hamlet teaches, than
find themselves in anyone’s dreams. Among the contents of Our World are possi-
ble events. In fact Our World is filled with possibilities. These are not, however,
ghost creatures of mind or language, nor are they facts about other worlds. Pos-
sibilities for you and for me are real possibilities inside of Our World. Consider
the possibility that in two or three minutes you stop reading and start singing. We
should reject the advice of many philosophers that, to locate this possibility, we
must investigate our own mental or linguistic creations. We must reject the ad-
vice of others that we turn our ontological attention to other worlds. The odd but
reality-based prospect of you finding yourself singing is rather for us the worldly,
here and now. Nor, for another example, do we need to look beyond this world
for the possibility that some short time ago you could have refrained from starting
to read these words. Real possibilities are neither inventions nor otherworldly.
They are firmly located inside our very own world. This is what needs to be made
intelligible. This is the topic of branching histories.
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Events. So possible events are part of Our World. The sticker is this. It can
happen that two events are each individually possible, while at the same time they
cannot happen together: Peter may turn left or he may turn right, so each is a real
possibility.2 But it is impossible that he does both. This is a fundamental fact
about how possibilities fit into Our World: Each of two events can happen, but
it is not possible that both happen. It sounds to the naive ear as if we are saying
that at most one of the two events can be part of Our World, but that is precisely
wrong. What we need to mediate the difficulty is the concept of a “history.”
Histories. A history is a collection of events that can all live together with con-
sistency. Past history is certainly like that. Since everything that did happen did
happen, there is no doubt that the entire past fits together into a single, consistent
story. There is, however, more to the idea of history than the past. Each history (in
the sense at issue) stretches also into the future. A history goes all the way back
and all the way forward. There is not only past history but future history.
Here we come both to the technical heart of the scheme in which we are work-
ing, and to a challenging problem in the philosophical analysis of temporal lan-
guage. On the technical side, each history is seriously maximal. Each history
contains every event that it can contain, subject to the consistency requirement. A
possible event is excluded from a history if it is not consistent with some portion
of that history; but that is the only limit. A history is as big as it can possibly be.
(Of course there is a rigorous definition here.) That is why, on this conception,
histories stretch into the remote future, long after the heat death of the sun.
On the analytical side, we must keep constantly in mind that serious attention
to alternative possibilities implies that there is no unique “future history.”3 Instead
there are many alternative and inconsistent possibilities.
Consistency. We can now say the following: Two or more possible events are
jointly consistent exactly when they fit into a single history. The point is that we
can say that not as if it were a new thing, an idle thought. Instead, because we
2From now on I shall usually bore you with the most mundane of examples, Peter deciding
whether to turn left or to turn right. The point is to prevent the philosophical distraction so easily
caused by interesting stories.
3In the language of logic, although the phrases “my left shoe” and “my world” have unique
referents determined by the context of utterance (Kaplan), “my future history” does not—simply
because an utterance event, like any other event, belongs to many histories each of which rep-
resents a distinct unfolding of possibilities. This is spelled out in tedious detail in chapter 6 of
Belnap et al. 2001.
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have taken the trouble to be rigorous, we can say it confidently and use it as a sure
guide when thinking about difficult matters such as action or indeterminism.
Branching. What, however, about branching? Here is the idea. Since there
are many inconsistent groups of events, there must be many histories. There are
the histories in which Peter goes left, each of which must be distinct from each
history on which Peter goes right. The question now is, How do these histories fit
together? On one all too common answer, each history is a “world” unto itself.
According to this answer, histories stand independently, like a row of parallel lines
that never, never meet. This answer, championed by David Lewis, is popular, but
it must be rejected. It is not an accurate account of our world. Picture Peter facing
the future, not having decided whether to turn left or to turn right. Here is the
critical point. His momentary indecision certainly belongs to only one world, our
world, but with equal certainty it belongs to more than a single history. There is
the continuation in which Peter goes left, and there is the continuation in which
he goes right. As we say idiomatically, there are in this world of ours two things
that Peter can do. Going left is a historical possibility and going right is also a
historical possibility.
Theory now extracts the following from this picture of Peter at the crossroads.
1. The past portions of these two histories are identical. The independent
worlds of Lewis’s theory never overlap, whereas in contrast the two his-
tories literally overlap. Each of the two histories literally contains Peter’s
indecision, and everything that led up to it. A mental or linguistic the-
ory would make these pasts “similar” instead of straightforwardly identical.
But that is wrong. We began by contemplating that there were for Peter two
possibilities, left and right, just as I have two shoes, say L and R. And just
as it is unhelpful to say that L’s owner is only “similar” to R’s owner, but not
identical, so it is unhelpful to say that the indecision in the past of Peter’s
possible left turn is only “similar,” but not identical, to the indecision lying
in the past of Peter’s possible right turn.
2. The future portions of these histories are entirely separate. One contains the
possible event of Peter’s going left, but excludes the possibility of his going
right. The other contains the (equally) possible event of Peter’s going right,
while excluding his going left. These portions are not merely dissimilar to
each other “under some description,” in the way, perhaps, that Quine’s spy
is descriptively dissimilar from Orcutt. They are straight-out, not to say
radically, distinct.
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3. But although the future portions of these histories are and remain totally
inscrutable each to each (no windows opening from the history-portion with
the left turn into the history-portion with the right turn), nevertheless, they
are connected in an important way: They share a common past. The possible
event of Peter’s going left has in its past Peter’s painful indecision; and so
does the possible event of Peter’s going right. These two inconsistent events
have the same past. That is how they fit together into our one and only
world. English tenses get the matter exactly right: If we locate ourselves at
the event constituting the possibility of a left turn, there and then we may
truly say, “Yes, Peter turned left, and a right turn is not now a possibility for
Peter, but it was true that he could have turned right.
4. And that is what we mean by ”branching histories.” Histories and therefore
events fit together to form a single world, Our World, and Our World looks,
to an approximation, like a “tree.” In the past all is consistent, and looking
back from our present prospect, we see a single stem or trunk. As, however,
we look towards the future—sometimes called the “open” future—there is
a branching into many possibilities, each consistent in itself, but only some
combinations of which go together to form a total history. (Let me interrupt
to note that later on we shall need to modify the picture. That is the job of
branching space-times.)
5. This, then, is the branching-history account of how events that are individ-
ually possible but jointly impossible can constitute a single, unified world.
The central point is that each pair of events, and especially inconsistent
events, are mediately connected by means of a past out of which they arise.
If a being were to stand off and look at the tree as a whole, it would see no
loose or disconnected pieces. Every possible event, no matter how remote,
is connected in some way or other to the here-now with which we begin.
Causal relation. The theory of branching histories also gives us a kind of prin-
ciple of causality. It says—rigorously, with no kidding around—that, in a simple
case, if you find yourself in one history instead of another, then you can always
look back into the past for a crucial branch point at which the world offered a turn
one way rather than another. What happens at that branch point serves as a truly
originating or productive cause. We call this the “prior choice” principle.
The prior choice principle says this:
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When we are looking for a token-level cause of some outcome, we may
always look to the past.4
This is a true and deeply important feature of Our World (we think), but watch
out: We do not say that it holds for “epistemic” causes or “linguistic” causes or
“scientific” causes, or any other man-made relation. To say that it did would be to
make an unreliable generalization about the workings of an unreliable instrument,
the human mind. Instead, the prior choice principle concerns only causes based
in reality.
2.3 Summary of branching histories
So much for the chief ideas of the theory of branching histories. When worked out,
the theory is rigorous and indeed formal. It is a theory about Our World, the only
one we have. It tells us that there are events that stand in a causal order. It tells us
that these events are organized into histories. It tells us that these histories branch,
but only forward. It tells us that causal choice points can always be found in the
past. Above all, it tells us that the causal order of our world permits alternative
possibilities for the future, whereas, in the words of a poet, the past is fixed in
stone.
One thing that I cannot make clear with this over-brief word picture of Peter
at the crossroads is this: I am alluding to an absolutely rigorous theory, which,
though omitted here, is given in detail in the listed references.
3 Agency, choice and unpretentious free will
Having given the chief ideas of branching histories themselves, how is this appli-
cation applied to action and agency? And how does this application give a low
key account of free will? The answers are related. They rest on four principles.
3.1 Four principles concerning agency
First principle about agency in Our World. The first principle is a logical prin-
ciple about language. It is this:
Whenever we can truly describe Peter as the agent in some affair, we can
find a particular sentence X such that Peter sees to it that X.
4The choice of “may” here over “must” is critical; see note 9.
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Example. For Peter to turn left is for Peter to see to it that he turns left.
This is a principle that only a logician could love. It nevertheless turns out
to be enormously helpful in thinking about agency. We didn’t make it up. In
fact, the principle that agency can always be described as a seeing-to-it-that is
originally due to St. Anselm, who discovered it nearly nine hundred years ago.
To my knowledge the principle was then absolutely and completely forgotten for
over eight hundred of those nine hundred years (§1D of Belnap et al. 2001 gives
a kind of mini-history of the matter). If we live by Anselm’s principle, we do not
have to think about or worry about or ask unanswerable questions about peculiar
ontological entities such as “Peter’s turning left,” or worse “Peter’s turning left
either slowly or not at all,” or perhaps worst, “Peter’s refraining from turning
left.” With what strange properties should we endow these postulated entities?
Anselm’s “sees to it that” formula directs us away from such unhelpful ontological
inquiries. That is one way in which his principle keeps our metaphysics low key.
Anselm’s “sees to it that” idea is simple. This very simplicity, however, gives
a solid impetus to further progress by use of the following very general fact about
language: New sentences can be built from old sentences. For example, refrain-
ing is a difficult concept in the philosophy of action. We can use the Anselm
perspective to give a helpful analysis of refraining.
Example. For Anselm to refrain (say) from accepting his episcopal office
from the tyrannous King William Rufus is precisely for Anselm to see to it
that Anselm does not see to it that Anselm accepts his episcopal office from
William Rufus.
That is of course a mouthful, or better, an earful. But after all, the situation is pre-
cisely one in which logic helps: It helps us, by providing us a logical notation (not
here displayed) that is easy for the eye exactly when English gives us complicated
and confusing sound-patterns that overburden the ear.
Second principle. The second principle is this:
There is no action, no agency, no doing without choice
Furthermore, and when spelled out this is part of the deep theory, the choice must
come before any outcome that is settled by the choice. You cannot choose to
modify the settled past. If we put these ideas together, we come to something like
the following major analytical equivalence.
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To see to it that X is to make a prior choice that guarantees that X.
Example. Peter has seen to it that he turned left if and only if Peter has
made a prior choice that guarantees that he turns left.
Probably it needs explicit mention that we are not saying that Peter’s choice must
precede his action of turning left; after all, our Anselm-based “sees to it that”
theory says nothing at all about some “action” to be called “Peter’s turning left.”
The second principle concerns only the conditions under which sentences are true.
It says nothing at all about when actions exist—or whatever it is that actions do.
This is yet another way in which our theory is low key.
Third principle. The third principle works together with the others. The third
principle has not been urged as often, but seems to us just as obvious and just as
critical:
There is no choice without choices.
That is, if the objective situation is such that Peter is truly described as having
any real choice at all, then Peter must have open to him more than once choice.
Peter cannot really and objectively choose to turn left unless he has another option
available to him that does not guarantee his turning left.
How, you may ask, are Peter’s objective options organized? Since they are
objective, there must be a principle of organization that does not lie entirely in
his mind, nor in language, nor even in logic. There must be a level at which we
can say how his options are organized in terms of the purely objective theory of
branching histories. In these terms, the outcome in which Peter turns left resides
(not in a single history but) in a certain family of histories. No history in this
family can (possibly) contain the outcome in which Peter turns right. In fact the
correct picture to have is that Peter’s choice constitutes a branch point. And that
is exactly what is claimed by our theory of agency.5
Fourth principle. There is one additional subtlety. The theory of agency when
set against the theory of branching histories gives rise to a new principle, a fourth
principle, a principle that has not yet been studied with the care it deserves. The
5Only very simple choice situations can be represented in terms of a single branch point. Our
research strategy has been to try to clarify the simple case before attacking the more complex ones,
some of which we also treat.
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reason for this is that the principle cannot even be properly stated without a de-
velopment of the rigorous theory of branching histories. Nevertheless, I can give
you its flavor in a slogan:
You cannot make tomorrow’s choices today.
You can plan and plan and plan, but if tomorrow is when you are given the choice
whether or not to eat fish for breakfast, then as an objective matter, it is impossible
for you to make that choice today. Sometimes we call this fourth principle “no
choice before its time.” Attention to this principle—first rigorously formulated
by von Kutschera and (later but independently) by P. Kremer, only in the mid-
eighties(!)—can only enrich moral philosophy and the philosophy of action.
Summary of principles. To summarize: (i) Agency is well codified with “see-
ing to it that” sentences. (ii) There is no agency without choice. (iii) There is no
choice without choices. And (iv) there is no choice before its time.
3.2 Unpretentious free will.
With these four principles I can quickly come to our unpretentious account of free
will. There are three key ways in which we keep a claim to “free will” simple and
straightforward.
1. In the first place, a serious claim to free will must always mention a par-
ticular agent. Our recommended “sees to it that” formula is ideal for this
purpose, precisely because one cannot complete the formula without spe-
cific reference to an agent.
2. Second, any meaningful claim to free will must make specific reference to
a possible outcome. Again, the “sees to it that” formula always requires a
specific sentence.
Example. The Bishop won the lottery. Question: Did the Bishop see
to it that the Bishop won the lottery? Well, no, it was a matter of
chance. No free will for that specific outcome. Change the example if
you like. Perhaps the Bishop fixed the lottery. Perhaps it is a matter of
the Bishop buying a ticket.
In any case, if you do change the example, please notice what you are doing.
Free will does not float free of particular agent or particular outcome.
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3. Last and of critical importance, our account of action and agency in the
context of branching histories requires reference to a particular moment or
locus of choice.
Let us gingerly approach an example with these three ways in mind.
1. First, we are tempted to ask, Is there any free will, or is the world instead
a place of blind adherence to natural law? When we frame the question in
this tempting way, we are tempted to respond in its own immodest terms.
We know that stars and machines are fixed in their trajectories, and so are
tempted to answer that not only stars and machines, but each thing whatso-
ever, follows out its preordained path. Perhaps, having been tempted by the
form of the question, we do not notice that this extremely universal theory
is pretentious. We are better off if, to begin with, we ask a much more par-
ticular question. Ask instead if Peter has free will. Can Peter ever see to
anything? That is much less immodest.
Be specific about the agent. It is a virtue of our “sees to it that” formula
that it is never complete without the name of a definite agent, and therefore
suggests the humbler question.
2. All right, so let us name the agent. Is, then, Peter, in particular, free, or is he
instead a creature of external and impersonal forces? That question is also
too general and will tempt you into immodesty. Be specific. The “sees to
it that” formula will help you. Do you want to know whether Peter can see
to it that he flies to the Moon on gossamer wings? No, he cannot. Or do
you ask if Peter can see to it that wins the Irish Sweepstakes? No, he does
not have available a choice that guarantees that outcome. Or do you rather
wonder whether Peter can see to it that he turns left? Yes, he can.
Be specific about the outcome. It makes a plain difference. For now, ac-
cording to the major analytical equivalence quoted above, we are asking in
a pedestrian fashion whether or not Peter has a choice in the matter of his
turning left. And of course he does.6
3. All right, let us both name the agent and the possible outcome. Can Peter
see to it that he turns left? Or can he do so only if he is in the grip of an
6You will have observed that nowhere do we offer positive arguments against immodest de-
terminism. Instead, we turn to thinking about problems, too little considered, that have low-key
indeterminism as a presupposition. Perhaps this is a mistake. In any event, that is the spirit in
which we say “of course he does.”
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appropriate combination of character, desire and belief, a combination that
is all by itself causally sufficient to bring about his turning left? Even that
is immodest.
Be specific about the moment. Suppose that at a certain moment Peter has
available a choice that guarantees his turning left. Then certainly our theory
says that after that moment he has used up his choice. His turning left is
already guaranteed, and Peter cannot undo that choice. He cannot alter the
settled past, he cannot make the same choice again. But also remember
the principle of “no choice before its time.” Our theory also asserts that no
choice can be made before the moment at which it becomes available. (And
I remind you that although that sounds like a barren tautology, it is instead
a deep principle concerning how choices fit into Our World.) So there is
for Peter and for his turning left a particular moment of choice. We may
turn over the moments before and after to the fierce determinist. But at that
very moment, neither sooner nor later, Peter has just a little free will in the
matter of his turning left. Moments of choice come and go. Carpe diem is
too crude. To choose, you must not only seize the day, but you must seize
the very moment.
For summary, American philosophy has yielded none better than three famous
baseball aphorisms commonly attributed to Yogi Berra.
• Here, first, is Berra’s statement of the principle of no choice before its time:
– It’s not over ’til it’s over.
• Second, Berra’s phrasing of the causal principle and the uniqueness of the
past:
– When it’s over, it’s over.
• And last, Berra’s own account of the practical attitude required of an agent
making choices in our indeterminist world:
– When you come to a crossroads, take it.
The upshot is that at that very moment of choice, we claim for Peter a portion
of unpretentious free will: At the moment of choice, Peter can make a choice
guaranteeing that he turns left, and he can also make a choice that goes right.
(Some people think this contradicts science. They are mistaken, probably both
with respect to freedom and with respect to science.)
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4 Branching space-times and modestly local inde-
terminism
Finally I turn briefly to the problem of modestly local indeterminism as a pre-
scientific idea. The fact is that histories do not really branch like a tree. Such a
picture would work if there were an objective meaning for a simultaneity-slice that
ran from one edge of the universe, so to speak, to the other. Such a simultaneity-
slice would allow histories to split globally. But we know from Einstein that to
think of such simultaneity-slices as objective is corrupt. We need another picture.
The new picture comes from the following observation. Individual histories
are not really ordered like a line. Our modern reverence for classical mechanics
and our related love of clock time deludes us. Not only fancy Einstein physics,
but even our ordinary experience (when uncorrupted by uncritical adherence to
Newton or mechanical addiction to clocks and watches) shows us that events are
not strung out one after the other. Take the event of our being here now. Indeed
some events lie in our future—or, better, keeping possibilities firmly in mind, we
should say that some events lie in our future of possibilities. Others lie in our
causal past. But there is a third category, always intuitive, and now scientifically
respectable, since we have learned in this century to be suspicious of the idea of
action at a distance. In this third category are events that neither lie ahead of us
as possibilities, nor do they lie behind us as determinate facts. Instead, they have
a space-like relation to us. Neither later nor earlier (nor frozen into simultaneity
by a mythical world-spanning clock), they are “over there.”
The jargon word for this structure of events is well known: It is called a space-
time. So each history, each possible course of events, is a space-time. It needs zero
training in mathematics to see that the theory of how such histories fit together into
a single world will be more complicated than the theory that we pictured with a
single tree. I mention only four key points underlying the theory of “branching
space-times.”7
1. Here is the first point. You will remember that histories are closely related
to the ideas of possibility and consistency. A key idea here is that what
allows two events to share a history, and therefore to be consistent, is that at
least one event lies in their common future. As long as there is a standpoint
7The theory of branching space-times is discussed in the following places: Belnap 1992, Szabo
and Belnap 1996, Rakic´ 1997, Belnap 1999, Placek 2000a, Placek 2000b, Belnap 2002, Mu¨ller
2002, and Placek 2002.
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in Our World from which one could truly say “both of these events have
happened,” even if the two events are not themselves arranged one after the
other, one may be confident that the two events can live together in single
history. Peter’s (possible) going to the dentist in one village and Paul’s
(possible) staying home in another village are consistent just in case there
is some (possible) standpoint at which someone could truly say, using the
past tense, that both events came to pass. Let us also turn this around:
If two events are inconsistent, then no event can have both of them in its
past. For example, although Peter’s choice to turn left or right is altogether
local, and although we cannot picture Our World as a tree, nevertheless,
there is no standpoint anywhere in Our World that has in its past both of the
inconsistent events represented by Peter’s having turned left and his having
turned right. These inconsistent possibilities can and must lie ahead of the
point at which he makes the choice, but they cannot both lie behind anything
whatsoever.
2. The second point is this. There have to be choice points, definite local events
at which two histories split into radically inconsistent portions. It is presum-
ably not true and we must not assume that when splitting occurs, it occurs
in some magical worldwide way. When Peter is given the choice to go left
or right on a certain occasion, that occasion is confined in space as well as
in time. His little bit of free will is local, not global. And the same might be
true when the choice is only metaphorical, a matter of a random outcome of
some natural event such as, perhaps, the decay of a radium atom in Paris. It
might be that the decay is a strictly local matter, neither influencing nor in-
fluenced by contemporary happenings in, say, Manhattan. Whenever there
is indeterminism, whether of choice or of chance, a good theory must give
meaning to the difficult idea that the indeterminism is local, not worldwide.
3. The third point is critical to understanding Our World. When I put the point
in everyday language, it sounds so obvious that you will yawn. And yet as
far as I know a thoroughly controlled statement has never been made apart
from the present theory of branching space-times. The key postulate for lo-
cating choice points may be put informally in the following way: Whenever
we find ourselves in one history instead of in another, we may always look
to the past for a choice point responsible for the splitting.
Example. Suppose that on a certain Friday in March a cat is sleep-
ing on its mat in a certain living room in Chicago. Think of this as
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a particular concrete event, and let it be contingent. Take any history
in which that event fails to occur, perhaps a history in which the cat
spends the whole of the Friday high in a tree in Lincoln park. The
theory guarantees that if you look in the causal past of the given con-
crete cat-on-the-mat event (the one that we are supposing occurred),
you will find a definite choice point at which things could have gone
either in the direction of keeping the cat-on-the-mat event possible, or
in the direction of keeping the cat-in-the-tree history possible.8 You
do not need to look in the future, and you also do not need to look far
away at events going on “over there.” The point is that examination of
the causal past of the cat-on-mat event suffices. (The theory does not
presume to say if the choice was up to the cat, or up to some human,
or perhaps a bit of natural randomness or some combination.)
The fourth point records a recognition of an important way in which the
theory should not be strengthened. The following is a principle that an
unwary philosopher might easily be inclined to endorse.
Tempting principle. If two choice points are related in a “space-like”
way, so that the second is “over there” with respect to the first, then
their respective choices are entirely independent of each other.9
Example. Aristotle tells us how two market-goers meet at the market,
as an “accidental” result of their choices that morning, made separately
in far-away villages. Their individual choices, we all suppose, are
bound to be totally uncorrelated, that is, independent, and that is what
the tempting principle says must be so.
The theory of branching histories, however, resists this temptation. And it
does not do so a priori. It does so because Our World seems, as a matter
of fact, to contain violations of the tempting principle. With reference once
more to Einstein, modern physics seems to tell us that in fact it is possi-
ble for two utterly random choice points to be space-like related, with no
hint of a line of causal connection between them, and nevertheless fail to
8The theory will not let you exchange “event” and “history” here; precision of statement is
essential.
9In Belnap 2002 this principle is suitable generalized and shown to be provably equivalent to
an equally tempting principle saying something like “every situation that is cause-like with respect
to a certain outcome event lies in the past of that event.”
16
be independent. I call this “funny business.” Reichenbach has taught us
that whenever we find the long arm of coincidence stretching across space,
it is in our nature to look for a common cause. Funny business precisely
happens when there is objective coincidence—which is to say, a failure of
independence—across space, without a common cause. Since modern-day
physics tells us that funny business happens, it is good that the theory of
branching histories has room for funny business—and indeed has the virtue
of permitting us to offer a stable (albeit conjectural) account as to the dif-
ference between (1) mere indeterminism without funny business and (2)
indeterminism with funny business.
These necessarily too-brief points allude to a theory of branching histories that
gives a satisfying account of how physical indeterminism can be local instead of
global. It gives us an account of how choices and outcomes of natural random
processes can affect only what lies in their causal future, touching neither their
past nor the vast region of space-like related events. But it does so in such a
way as to allow plenty of room for individually random processes to be, as the
physicists say, “entangled.” Or, in the phrase I just used, the theory of branching
histories helps us to come to terms with funny business.
The result is that the theory of branching histories, in addition to helping us
clarify ideas of action and agency, provides low key suggestions for articulating
some of the strangest phenomena uncovered by contemporary physicists. It does
this by avoiding careless or fuzzy or sloppy formulations. It does this by insist-
ing on a careful and rigorous account of what it is for indeterminism to be not
immodestly global, but modestly local.
5 Wrap up
So much for branching histories. So much for the application to action, agency,
and choice. So much for the application to physical indeterminism, and especially
to funny business.
In closing I should like to emphasize one critical feature of our point of view.
It is this: For indeterminism and free will, we need to consider just one world.
This world, Our World, is big and complicated enough to contain everything,
both agents and atoms, both choices and chances, and of course much else. The
objective causal order binds all together, without benefit of “laws” or other prod-
ucts of the imagination. And Our World, yours and mine, is especially rich in
possibilities for our future.
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